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Discussion Following the Remarks of
Professor Earl Fry and Professor John Quinn
QUESTION, Professor Henry King, Jr.: Professor Quinn, what are
the indications, if any, that the Canadian government is considering the
type of agreements you've discussed?
ANSWER, Professor Quinn: The present government's position is
one of caution. The only paper on the subject has been the Kelleher
Discussion Paper (How to Secure and Enhance Canadian Access to Ex-
port Markets). The Royal Commission Report should be published this
summer and the consultation process which Minister Kelleher has been
conducting should also be finished. I think any decision about a frame-
work for U.S.-Canada negotiations will be made late this summer. No
one in the government has yet said anything publicly about these
questions.
QUESTION, Mr. Alan Wolff: Professor Quinn, how do you avoid
the consultation process from resulting in a "lowest common denomina-
tor" approach made to minimize the exposure of the provincial officials?
Also, how can you keep the process from losing momentum and the re-
sult being less than expected?
ANSWER, Professor Quinn: There is an analogy here to the debate
over whether to have a sectoral or a comprehensive framework for nego-
tiating on trade barriers. A comprehensive framework facilitates trades
across provincial interests. A narrower framework results in each prov-
ince only looking at its own costs and benefits and not at the national
gains.
Concerning momentum, there is a point in trade negotiations when
a momentum is achieved and suddenly the deal is made. But in a process
in which each province has a de facto veto this momentum might not be
achievable-the provinces can renege at any time, which makes such an
agreement risky. Provincial premiers might find ways to avoid the obli-
gations of the agreement. That is a risk, although generally a province
will not want to be seen as obstructive to an agreement which benefits
everyone. Institutional changes are important in that they would prevent
such sub rosa actions.
QUESTION, Mr. Frank Stone: Professor Quinn, this is not a new
problem-the Canadian government signing international agreements
which it cannot necessarily implement because of provincial jurisdic-
tion-why has it suddenly become so important?
ANSWER, Professor Quinn: It is true the provinces have always
had the power to decide whether or not they will implement the treaties
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that fall within their areas of legislative jurisdiction. But it is only since
the 1970's that non-tariff measures, which fall within provincial jurisdic-
tion, have been the subject of trade negotiations. It's not that the law has
changed, but that the issues on the international negotiating agenda have
changed, and many of them are now within provincial jurisdiction.
I'm in favor of a strong institutional body to enforce free-trade
agreements, preferably a judicial dispute resolution body. But that may
not solve the problem, since a judicial decision aimed at the government
in Ontario will not affect the internal problem of provincial jurisdiction.
A strong supernational body will not solve the internal constitutional
problem.
QUESTION, Professor Thompson: Professor Quinn, I believe there
are some areas where an institutional arrangement, to deal with the
problems you've identified, is unnecessary. It's not necessary to specify
procedures for domestic procurement because they already exist. All of
the provinces and municipalities in Canada have public bidding and
abide by the standards set up by their auditors. It is the law at the pro-
vincial level that makes discrimination in this area possible and there is
authority to change these laws and eliminate most discrimination.
Secondly, regarding price discrimination, the solution there is sim-
ply to amend the Anti-Combines Act to permit private actions and pri-
vate remedies. Could you comment on these points?
ANSWER, Professor Quinn: The problem with a general prohibi-
tion on discrimination is that, unless the system is clear regarding the
objective criteria used to decide who wins a contract, it's very difficult to
know whether the government purchaser is discriminating or not. Fur-
ther, the divisions of power in the Canadian Constitution impose severe
constraints on what the federal government can do to get compliance
from the provinces. In the area of product standards, for example, the
federal government could pass a general statute prohibiting discrimina-
tory product standards, but it could probably not implement Canada's
treaty obligations by homogenizing product standards throughout the
country.
Regarding a private right of action for price discrimination, there is
an implied exemption in the anti-combines law for provincially owned or
regulated businesses. In the late 1950's the federal government tried to
prosecute the very concentrated brewing industry, which is provincially
regulated. The court stated that provincial regulation of the industry
was constitutionally permissible and that the industry was exempt from
the federal anti-combines law. It seems unlikely, therefore, that a court
would allow a private right of action where it does not allow a public
one.
QUESTION, Mr. Jacques Roy: Professor Fry, how difficult is it
going to be for the United States federal government to impose its views
on the states regarding government procurement, to abolish the "Buy
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State" or "Buy American" state provisions and possibly open their mar-
kets to Canadian bids?
ANSWER, Professor Fry: I think the federal government could le-
gally and constitutionally impose its will on the states regarding procure-
ment, but I don't think the Administration will expend the political
capital needed to do so unless the trade agreement involved something
very substantial, such as comprehensive free-trade. Such an effort would
not be made simply for the sake of a sectoral arrangement. Furthermore,
it would be necessary to perceive a willingness on the part of the Cana-
dian provinces to adhere to such a non-discriminatory procurement
program.
COMMENT, Robert Latimer: I've spent the last four years consult-
ing with the Canadian provinces about their role in the international
trade market and found that there is beginning to develop an ability to
form a consensus among them. Further, I believe the provinces have the
ability to respond substantively and with consensus to an international
relationship with the United States in a more promising way than is evi-
denced by the fifty states.
COMMENT, Professor Robert Hudec: There is some interesting
background on the relationship of the Congress and the states over the
problem of international agreements affecting the states. When the
GATT was negotiated in 1947, in order to get it through Congress, it was
necessary for the State Department to advise the Congress that the agree-
ment would not touch the states. In 1958, a Hawaiian territorial court
had the first case involving the GATT and state law and it decided the
GATT superseded the state law. The State Department wrote a memo-
randum explaining what it had said to Congress in 1947, but the petition
for rehearing was turned down.
When the Tokyo Round agreements were brought back to the Con-
gress there were two central issues. One was whether a standards code
would be applied to the states; it was decided such a code would be en-
couraged by the federal government, but not imposed. The second was
government procurement; it was decided the Code did not apply to the
states.
There is a tremendous political problem involved when you ask the
Congress to override state legislation. The Federal government has the
power to override the states, but politics makes this very difficult.
COMMENT, Mr. Jon Fried: The description of the consultative
process in Canada needs further elaboration. Canadian negotiators are
well aware of the divided responsibility for treaty implementation in
Canada and this has been built into the treaty negotiation process. The
provinces are consulted from the initial stages of negotiation. This sensi-
tivity on the part of the federal government usually has led to a smooth
transition at the implementation stage. The observation that the ten
provinces are probably more able to form a consensus on an international
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treaty than the fifty states is seemingly correct. Canada has about 11,000
international treaties or agreements, over a 1,000 of which are with the
United States. Half of these impinge on provincial jurisdiction but there
has rarely been a problem in this regard.
QUESTION, Mr. Stephen Lyons: I wonder whether Mr. Latimer
was correct in his assessment that the U.S. government would have a
more difficult time convincing the states to let down their trade barriers
than the Canadian federal government would have with the provinces.
Professor Fry, are there any instances where the U.S. government wasn't
able to convince the states to follow it where something of national inter-
est was involved?
ANSWER, Professor Fry: There are some examples. The President
has issued a strong declaration in support of foreign investment activity
in the U.S. Several states, however, continue to impose unitary taxation,
a system of taxation which discourages foreign investment. Thus far,
Washington has chosen merely to ask the states to reconsider this form
of taxation. Perhaps, though I don't believe this to be the case, the fed-
eral government was foresighted enough to realize that intense competi-
tion for foreign investment would eventually convince many of the states
to discard the unitary formula of taxation by their own volition.
QUESTION, Mr. Jon Fried: Professor Fry, what are your views on
regulated services, in terms of price discrimination upon entry into the
United States? What will be the impact, particularly of American anti-
trust law, on an industry or sector in which the Canadian government is
involved, either through regulation or control?
ANSWER, Professor Fry: The major problem in this area is that
Americans do not understand how different the Canadian system is from
our own. The United States considers its system to be laissez-faire ori-
ented, which in many cases it is not. On the other hand, the level of
government intervention in the economic sector is definitely much
greater in Canada than in the United States. The Canadians are not
going to change their system, nor should they. There may be some major
problems ahead if American business and government leaders think that
the influence of Crown corporations will diminish, either at the provin-
cial or federal level, or that Canada will move towards wholesale
deregulation.
The solution for avoiding these problems is better education in the
United States and a recognition that the Canadians are not going to dras-
tically change a system they overwhelmingly support. U.S. policymakers
will be required to understand the nature and extent of government activ-
ity in the Canadian economy and work for a bilateral agreement which
will minimize frictions between the two quite different North American
political and economic systems.
224 [Vol. 10:221 1985]
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 10 [1985], Iss. , Art. 33
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol10/iss/33
